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. . STATEMENT OF THE NAT! JRE
OF THE CASE

The appellant, Geraldine M. Davis, appeals from an

01: d e i: c i: ci e i: i i i g 11 i a t a ] ] p e rm a n e i: 11 r i g!: I t s o f • • • • • •»?. •. • r ,
Geraldine M. Davis (Winger) including residual rights,
be permanently and completely terminated pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 55-10-109, as amended 1953.

The case

was tried before the Honorable John Farr Larson, presiding in the Second District Juvenile court, Salt Lake
County.
DISPOSITION" IN THE I .OWER COURT
->• November c,
•- * -

*

'

• ,

1-3 75, the Second J> tri ct Juvenile.
- permanent rights of the mother, •

2
Geraldine M. Davis (Winger), including residual rights,
be permanently and completely terminated.

The lower

Court further ordered that the State Division of Family
Services is authorized and directed to make permanent
plans, including adoption if possible, for the child,
Ricky Winger,, Thereafter, appellant filed notice of
Appeal on December 5, 1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in her favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The minor child, Ricky Winger, was born December 31,
1973. Following his birth and release from the hospital,
he remained with his parents until March 8, 1974, when
the police removed him for his protection while his parents were involved in a serious argument.
The child is microcephalic, hypotonic (lack of muscle tone), motor delayed and mentally retarded.
Geraldine M. Davis is the twenty four year old
mother of the child, Ricky Winger.

Appellant has full

scale I.Q. of 52, with a verbal I.Q. of 61 and performance
I.Q. of 46, placing her in the mental defective range
at a level of trainable, mentally retarded.
The proceedings in the Second District Juvenile

3
Court were brought pursuant to petitions of both parents
of the child, for return of custody and guardianship
and on the petition of the State seeking permanent termination of parental rights and in support thereof, alleging pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 55-10-109 (l)(a)/
as amended 1953, that "the parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition

seriously det-

rimental to the child.11
Although during the proceedings in the Second District Juvenile Court

there was no proof that Ricky

Winger had ever been abused or neglected, the lower Court
ruled in favor of the State and against both parents and
found that appellant was mentally and emotionally unable
to provide the child with proper care and stability and
ordered that all parental rights of appellant in the
child Ricky Winger be permanently and completely terminated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE MOTHER OF THE MINOR CHILD, RICKY
WINGER OF ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THAT SAID DECISION WAS BASED ONLY UPON FEAR THAT THE MOTHER
MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HARM THE MINOR CHILD OR
OTHERWISE BE UNABLE TO PROPERLY CARE FOR THE
CHILD, NOT THAT SHE HAD EVER HARMED THE CHILD
IN THE PAST OR BEEN NECESSARILY UNABLE TO PROPERLY CARE FOR THE CHILD IN THE PAST.
Appellant

was permanently deprived of the custody

4
of her minor child, Ricky Winger, pursuant to § 55-10-109
(l)(a), by finding that appellant, the natural parent,
was "unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition

seriously detrimental to the child."

However,

in implementing this statute the Juvenile Court is required to follow the general guidelines of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1965 wherein, in section 63, is stated the
purpose of the act:

*

' <

-

-

*- ' * •"

"It is the stated purpose of this act to secure
for each child coming before the Juvenile Court
such care, guidance, and control, preferably
in his own home, as will serve his welfare and the
best interest of the State; to preserve and
strengthen family ties whenever.possible...."
The phraseology of, "preferably in his own home,"

"and to preserve and strengthen family ties" indicates
that there exists in this State a fundamental preference for keeping the family unit together.
law also strongly supports this notion.

The case

In the Utah

case of In re State in the Interest of L.J»J.,
2d

11 Utah

393, 360 P.2d 486, at 488, the Court stated;
"Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a presumption that it will
be for the best interest of the child to be
raised under the custody, control and supervision of his natural parents...the ultimate
burden of proof on this question is always in
favor of the natural parents and against any
other-->person seeking custody of such child,
in addition thereto, this presumption is based
on logic, and experience shows generally that

5
parents have more love, devotion and regard for
their own children than dofatherpeople."
The Court in another opinion, State in the Interest
of F-,D* and P- v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948, at
949, states:
"We are entirely in agreement with the presumption
in which appellant seeks refuge, that it is generally for the best interest and welfare of the
child to be reared under the care of their natural
parents; are appreciative of the mutual advantages
to be found in the love, affection, and interest
which parent and children normally show each other;
.and of the seeming harshness of allowing the law
to step in and deprive them of these values. That
the cutting of family ties is a step of the utmost
gravity which should be done only for the most compelling reasons is not to be questiond. This is
even more true because to do so results in relieving
the natural parents of the duty to support and care
for their offspring and places the burden upon the
State. Everyone will concede that this is undesireable, both socially and economically, and therefore to be avoided unless that is the only alternative to be found consistent with the best interest
of the children.*1
The Court goes further at page 950 in the same
case and states concerning the deprivation of the parents'
custody of children, "we agree that this is a drastic
remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme cases
and when it is manifest that the chome cannot and will not
support such an "extreme case" in the situation of the
' •:.:^,/;-..

appellant as will be shown below.
It
enacting

is

clear

the

that the legislature

foregoing

stipulation

intaiided

by

6
t h a t this C o u r t h a s a l w a y s s o c o n s t r u e d t h e J u v e n i l e
C o u r t A c t t o hold that the p u r p o s e of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n
should b e a c c o m p l i s h e d by w o r k i n g w i t h t h e p a r e n t s a n d
c h i l d r e n w i t h i n t h e h o m e a n d t o p r e s e r v e the f a m i l y ° s
s t a t u s w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e , and t h a t c h i l d r e n s h o u l d n o t
b e r e m o v e d f r o m t h e h o m e or f r o m c u s t o d y of their

parents

b e f o r e it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t that c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t in t h e
h o m e w h i c h a r e "seriously d e t r i m e n t a l " t o t h e w e l f a r e
of the child.:

V/,,,-,,,;..a

: r.. , , .t ... •• '.- . ;-

"One of the b a s i c t e n e t s of o u r system of law a n d
j u s t i c e is t h a t it a t t e m p t s t o a c c o r d to a l l i n d i v i d u a l s
p r o t e c t i o n in

their p e r s o n s a n d p r o p e r t y , a n d t h i s is

t r u e , a f o r t i o r i , of c h i l d r e n . "

State in i n t e r e s t of

K-B-, 326 Utah 2d 398,- 326 P.2d 395. The Juvenile Court
is the agency of our government which is given the primary responsibility for the protection of children and
it is given broad powers of discretion in determining
the custody of a child.

However, this Court has re-

peatedly cautioned the Juvenile Courts to exercise sound
judgment in use of the discretion in them vested and has
set certain limits on such discretion.

In State in the

Interest of K-B-, supra, at 397, the Court stated:
"It seems plain that the intended purpose to be
divined from the statutes above quoted is that the
Juvenile Court has authority to permanently deprive

7
parents of the custody of the children when circumstances make such action necessary for their
protection and welfare. In so concluding we are
aware that such power is indeed awesome in the
effect it may have upon the lives of the persons
involved. It should be administered with sound
discretion and with due regard for the presumption
that the natural parent is the proper custodian of
his child, in that it is the policy of the Courts
to be reluctant to deprive parents of their child-r
ren.,f
Although it is clear that an extremely strong presumption exists in favor of the natural parents, this
Court has held that it will not distrub the findings
and determination of the Juvenile Court unless it is
found that they are clearly against the weight of the
evidence or that it is plainly manifest that the Juvenile
Court abused its discretion.

State in interest of

F-,D-and P- v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 947 at 951.
In the instant case it is apparent that such discretion was abused by the Juvenile Court.

The record

indicates that the Court found that appellant by reason
of being mentally and emotionally retarded would be unable
to properly care for her child.

This decision was based

largely upon the testimony of Dr. Liebroder, the
cologist who examined the mother.

psy-

The Court also heard

testimony from three other witnesses?

a supervisor

of foster care in the Division of Family Services, a
case worker with Division of Family Services, and another

8
case worker with the Division of Family Services, who all
testified that it was their opinion that appellant was
not able to properly care for the child, Ricky Winger.
The Juvenile Court Judge also noted as part of the basis
for his finding of the present condition of the mother
the fact that he had observed her at often times engaging
in inappropriate conduct in the Courtroom.

However,

the Juvenile Court's observation of the mother's temperment during the trial should certainly not be regarded as being evidence of the mother's normal behavior.
In fact, this was the subject of a discussion by the
Federal District Court of the District of Columbia where
a mother had repeatedly and in contempt of Court
rupted the Judge holding the hearing.

inter-

The Court dis-

missed the mother's conduct, stating that such interruptions of Court "might have been no more than the
natural acts of a distraught mother."
72 App DC 389, 114 F.2d 825.

Re Stuart (1940),
;

tr

The reason for the Juvenile Court's abuse of discretion lies in the fact that there was also substantial
evidence adduced at the Juvenile Court hearings that
appellant would be able with help to properly care for
her child and that in fact she had cared for him adequately in the past without help. Marshall Perkins,

9
M.S.W. and PhJD., a psyschologist, testified that he saw
appellant as immature with some emotional instability,
but that he did not see this as being dangerous to the
child, and disagreed with the State's position to permanently terminate the mother's parental rights.
Mrs. Evelyn Holts, a Nutrition Aid from the Extension
Service, testified that the mother became easily excited, but that the mother did a fairly adequate job of
bathing, dressing and getting the child to sleep after
his bath.

It was her opinion also that the mother would

need supervisory help to care for the child, but with
the mother's temper she was fearful of the child's safety.
However, there was no probf that in the time the child
was cared for by his mother that the mother had ever lost
her temper with the child or that she had ever harmed
or abused the child.
Mr. Kenneth Salzman, M.S.W., saw the mother as selfcentered and retarded but able to function with help. He
did not see her as harmful to the child.
Mr. and Mrs. Waldo J. Harris, testified that they
had had ample opportunity to observe appellant with her
baby.

They both testified that they had never noticed

any harm to the baby and indicated that the mother was
very tender-hearted and testified that they thought the

10
mother could be a good mother.
Also in appellant 9 s favor was the fact that, during
the course of the Juvenile Court hearings she married one
John Davis.

The Court noted that M r . Davis had some

stability, having held a job for a number of years.
Mr. Davis also testified that he thought that appellant
would make a good wife and mother.

:

There was no evidence introduced at any time during
the hearings to substantiate any claim that appellant had
ever in the past harmed, abused or neglected the child.
Yet in spite of this the Juvenile Court still terminated
appellant's parental rights in her child.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that
a very strong presumption exists both by statute and by
case law in Utah that the parent is the best guardian of
his or her child.

It is also apparent that the Juvenile

Court possesses a wide latitude of discretion in determining child custody matters but that this discretion
must be closley guarded to prevent abuse.

^

It is clear

that in this case such discretion was abused by the
Juvenile Court in that the evidence adduced at the Court
clearly did not preponderate to the extent necessary to
overcome this presumption on two different, distinct
grounds.

V'X\V •. ,,,,'

*

.;
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First, in addition to the testimony of the State's
witnesses there was substantial testimony that appellant
would be properly able to care for her child with help.
Certainly, appellant is entitled to an opportunity and
a chance to have some assistance provided for her to
care for her own child in her home, "since the right
of a parent, under natural law, to establish a home and
bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond the
reach of any Court. ,f Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042. Affording
her such an opportunity is certainly harmonious with the
purpose of the Juvenile Court Act and the Utah cases
previously cited.

Appellant is entitled to the op-

portunity to raise her child, even with help if necessary, and the Juvenile Court under these circumstances
should not be allowed to deprive her of this fundamental
right.
Second, the Juvenile Court abused its discretion
in terminating appellant's parental rights without any
evidence of past abuse or neglect by the mother.

In

fact, appellant evidenced just the opposite during the
four months that the child was still in her custody.
The evidence showed that appellant did an adequate job
of caring for her child.

The State's witnesses to a
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large extent based, their opinion that the child would
be unsafe in the mother's hands on the fact that the
mother, in their opinion, became easily frustrated.
However/ any parent of small children can easily testify that the times when a parent is liable to become the
most greatly frustrated with a child is probably when the
child is less than two years old.

Ricky Winger is now

almost 2 1/2 years old> well past this frustrating age.
"No Juvenile Court can, for any but the gravest reasons,
transfer a child from its natural parent to any other
person."

People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N # E.

2d 895 at 896, 303 N.Y. 539 at 538, Meyer v. Nebraska,
supra.

It is clear that in this case such "grave reasons"

do not exist. Appellant is now married to a man of
stability, she is able to provide a proper home for
the child and evidence introduced at the hearings showed
that she could, with help if needed, properly and adequately care for her child.

Several cases concerning

the removal of children from the custody of their parents
have been reviewed by this Court.

In every case examined

where the Juvenile Court's termination of parental rights
had been affirmed it was

found that the parent who was

to be deprived of custody had in the past abused or neglected the child*

No case had been found wherein a parent
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w a s deprived of custody without there having been proof
of some j: >ast abuse or:1 neglect of the chi Id

In fact

this Court has gone even further and returned custody
of minor cl i:i ldre i: 1 t :o the r latura] parent where the Ju \/eni ] e
Court had found that the parents had in the past

neglected

the child, such as where a parent had failed to provide
dental care for two minor children even after being
advised of the need for such care,
Inez Pilli ng v,» Lance

State in Interest of

2 3 1 Jtah 2d 407 (1 970)

464 P. 2d

395.
The State :i i i I :! le J uvenile Cour t proceedings fai ] ed
to overcome the presumption i n the favor of the natural
.parent,

"n so doing the Juvenile Court abused its d:i se-

cretion in finding that appellant was "unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seriously

" '

detriment .a] 1 .o t ,1 i< a < : :1 :i :i ] J :1 " Therefore the judgment : o i: ."' '.' '••
the Second District Juvenile Cou rt should be reversed
and custody

« : >. I: 1 J ic < : 1: :i i ] i

R :i .ck*

\ 7inge M: , re tun led to .'.'

appellant.

UTAH-CODE ANNOTATED § 55«10-109 # as amended 1953,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING VOID FOR VAGUENESS
AND THAT IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE M A N N E R IN
WHICH IT WAS IMPLEMENTED AGAINST APPELLANT.
The statute in question violates appellant's right
to due process by establishing a standard w h i c h is impos-

14
*

sible for appellant to ascertain in advance .and makes
a finding of a Court adverse to the appellant a drastic
and traumatic occurrence.

Indeed it could be said that

there exists no civil penalty more drastic and traumatic.
v

Due to the seriousness of the penalty involved, and

due to the nature of the proceedings wherein the State
versus an individual in a criminal type proceeding, this
type of statute should be subject to the same degree of
clarity to which criminal statutes are subject.

In

United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that criminal statutes must
be definite as to the persons within the scope of the e
statutes and the acts which are penalized.

In Musser v.

Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), the Supreme Court considered
a charge of conspiracy to violate public morals under
sub-section (5) Utah Code Annotated § 103-11-1, as
Amended 1943, and said:
"Legislation may run afoul' of the Due Process
Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance
to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which
they are charged, or to guide courts in trying
those who are accused."
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, that
section, was delcared unconstitutional.
Musser, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah).

State v.

15
The section in question is just as ambigious as the
statute struck down in the Musser case.

It states simply

that "the Court may decree a termination of all parental
rights with 'respect to one or both par ents :i f the Court
finds:

(a)

"If the parent or parents are unfit ox

i n e oixip e t en t by r e a s on o f c ondu c t o r c ond i t i on s e r i on s 1 y
detrimental to the child."

§ 55-10-109

(1)(a).

a standard is totally vague and ambiguous.

Such

Nothing

is stated concerning what standards are to be used to
determine whether or not a parent is "incompetent by
reason of conduct or: conditi on st "re^sly dr»^i;r.--n?'-;jl
to the child,"

''';'^-

An argument could be -ndde *:nnt: a more

def ina to .:m:i st rioU. y defined standard is impossible
given the nature of such castes.
serves

"-'•v'-

'

This argument, however,

only to point out the fact that the Juvenile

Court itself really has no idea under what circumstan

.

:

:s

i t will find that a parent is incompetent to care for his
child.

The result is that the parent has no i dea what •"••':

conduct constitutes a violation of the statute in question.
In Lanzetta v a New Jersey,306 U 0 S 0 451 , the Supreme Court '
held that a statute must bo sufficiently explicit to inform those subject, Ic iL as to whdt conduct vill render
them liable to its penalties, and a statute forbidding
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessari 1 y cji iess at i 1 .s meaning

16
and differ as to its application is violative of due proc e s s . . . ; •::..• •,r;^rv|;.'-. ; ,\---

.(;. : - • . ••/,..,.— ;. \ • •;,: - r? / ••••, -r\ • •..-;:•:- r •'•:••.;>. o .- . .-..

This problem is extremely aggravated by the instant
case where the Juvenile Court found a "condition seriously detrimental to the child."

Appellant's custody

was terminated solely because she had the misfortune
to be born mentally retarded and not on any past conduct
on her part.

,

,

§ 55-10-109 further denies appellant herein equal
protection under the law in that it establishes an arbitrary
class of conduct and the inclusion of appellant denies
appellant of the "basic and fundamental right

of a

parent under natural law, to establish a home and bring up children."

Meyer v. State of Nebraska, supra.

It

would appear that the Juvenile Court has construed

/

the

-

statute so as to create a class of people who are to
be considered incompetent to exercise the valuable and
fundamental right of parenthood and therefore denies
them the same. The class included by this statute
then is the class of mentally retarded people.
Our Courts have sustained certain classifications
when reasonable.

However, the Supreme Court has made

justification much more stringent where the inclusion
within the class denies a basic right.

The Supreme

Court and this Court have held that the right to

M

;

1/

parenthood is an extremely fundamental right and that a l l
the presumptions lie in favor of the competency of a
natural parent to be the guardian of h i s children and
that the State will terminate this right only for the
gravest compelling reasons.

Meyer

v _ State of_Nefaraska,

supra, People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, supra, State in
1 nteres t__of_KrB-/ supra 0

'.•:;::•.;/

,

•*-•'..>

."" ••

It is submitted that the classification used by the
Juvenile Court for termination of appellant's parental .,.y:-.
rights w a s clearly arbitrary.

It can be argued that ,

the ruling of the Juvenile Court w a s n o t arbitrary in
that extensive hearings were conducted on the matter.^'^-ein the Juvenile Court before it ordered appellant s s
parental rights terminated,.

However, this further a c - " ;

cents appellant 8 s point that the ruling was arbitrary.
Even after: such extensive hearings, there w a s still

•';••• .y

no evidence that appellant had ever neglected or abused••.;,.-•
L.he child.

T h e evidence w a s in fact that in the past

she had done a fairly adequate job of caring for her >•..-.•.,
child.

Such an arbitrary ruling clearly violates

appellant's rights to equal prot .ection under the

law as

well as constituting an abuse of the discretion vested
in the Juvenile Court,,

., •:.•••.-.-• .' • -" •,•••• - - ,- :

Appellant is certainly aware that the statute involved LLJ intended to protect children from the potential of abuse or neglect of a parent.

Such protection

<
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however, can and must be provided without the deprivation
of the parent's constitutional rights and these rights
have been violated where there was evidence that appellant
had done an adequate job of caring for her child in the
past without evidence of any abuse or neglect.
§ 55-10-109 (1)(a) then is unconstitutional as
applied to appellant because it denies a parent his
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process
of law by establishing a standard which is vague and

;

ambiguous and impossible for any person to ascertain in
advance.

This is especially true in the instant case

where the condition found to be seriously detrimental
to the child was the mother's mental retardation with
no finding that appellant had ever abused or neglected
her child in the past and that in fact there was evidence to show that in the past appellant had been a
good mother and had done an adequate job in providing
l

and caring for her child.
CONCLUSION

6

r

The appellant respectfully submits that the
Juvenile Court abused the discretion vested in it when
it terminated all parental rights
minor child, Ricky Winger.

of appellant in the

This decision was clearly

against the weight of the evidence in that, first,
there was evidence that the mother could in the future

19
property care for her child if given help and cnat

•.•~.-

she had done an adequate job in the past without help.
Second, there was no proof that appellant had ever

.-• ..•

neglected or abused her .child in the past.
Appellant further submits that § 55-10-109 (1) (a) -.-•
is unconsti ti itiona] oi I i ts face and as applied to
appellant*

First, the statute is vague and ambiguous

on its face and sets no guidelines
prudent

.
- •

for any reasonably ~,

person to determine what constitutes a violation

of the standards that this statute is designed to enforce.
Second, the statute is unconstitutional as applied to
appellant in that it has been used to create an arbitrary
c

Massification (mental retardation), and the inclusion

of appellant therein has deprived her of one of the
most basi c and fundamental ..rights afforded to every
person: the right to parenthood.
The removal of a child from its natural mother
is a most drastic and traumatic action.

No greater

property right or right in life is involved in any other
judicial action.

When such a drastic step becom.es

necessary it should be based upon good sound evidence
of record dul y considered in appropriate judicial . •• .
circumstances.,
IUIJ,

r >

Tne record as is now before this Court
;..» evidence considered by the Juvenile

20
Court was not sufficient to overcome the presumptions
of law afforded the natural parents of minor children
and that the Juvenile Court abused the discretion in it
vested by terminating all parental rights of appellant.
Concern for proper judicial administration and due concern
for the fundamental rights of appellant to raise her
natural child requires that this Court reverse the
decision of the Juvenile Court and return custody of the
child

Ricky Winger to his mother.
Respectfully submitted,

DALE R. KENT
Attorney for PetitionerAppellant
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